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In this Letter, we prove the unconditional security of single-photon differential phase shift quantum
key distribution (DPS-QKD) protocol, based on the conversion to an equivalent entanglement-based
protocol. We estimate the upper bound of the phase error rate from the bit error rate, and show
that DPS-QKD can generate unconditionally secure key when the bit error rate is not greater than
4.12%. This proof is the first step to the unconditional security proof of coherent state DPS-QKD.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are one of the most important applications of quantum information
theory. Great efforts have been devoted to prove the unconditional security of these protocols through noisy channels.
The first QKD protocol, named Bennett and Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol[1], has been proven to be unconditionally
secure[2, 3].
In 2002, Inoue et al. proposed the differential phase shift quantum key distribution (DPS-QKD) protocol[4], where
Alice encodes the key bits by preparing the relative phase shifts between two consecutive pulses in 0 or π and Bob
employs a one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder (M-Z) interferometer to retrieve the key from the phase shifts. The advantages
of DPS-QKDmainly lie in its simple and robust experimental implementation. Only one measurement basis is involved
in the protocol, and thus the experiment requires minimum setup, namely, one source and two detectors. Also, for
the BB84 protocol, Alice should generate a random base string to encode the key and Bob also needs to randomly
select his measurement bases. However, in DPS-QKD, they do not need to perform these two steps. Furthermore,
DPS-QKD utilizes the relative phases of the pulses which are not affected by the birefringence in fibers. Finally, by
using coherent sources, DPS-QKD is secure against photon-number-splitting attack, because they can be detected[5],
2while the BB84 protocol with coherent sources requires intensity modulators to generate decoy states to prevent
such attack[6]. Thanks to these simplicities, experiments over long distances and with high bit rates have been
performed[7, 8]. On the other hand, whether DPS-QKD is unconditionally secure is an important problem both
from the practical and theoretical aspects. So far, the security against limited attacks such as the general attack for
individual photons[9] and the so-called sequential attack[10] have been analyzed.
In this Letter, as the first important step towards the security proof of coherent state DPS-QKD, we present the
proof of the unconditional security of DPS-QKD with a single-photon source against the most general attacks. This
proof gives insight to the underlying security properties of DPS-QKD. By analyzing an equivalent entanglement-
based DPS-QKD, we find that the phase error rate of each time slot can be upper-bounded by the bit error rate of
the same time slot and its adjacent time slots. Thus, the unconditional security is achieved by performing privacy
amplification based on the upper bound of the phase error rate. Thanks to the equivalence, we can apply the results
to the prepare-and-measure DPS-QKD.
Before constructing the entanglement-based protocol, we define the encoded states in the prepare-and-measure DPS-
QKD. With the single-photon source, Alice splits the single-photon wavepacket into n pulses with identical amplitudes
to form a block. Particularly, the state before encoding the secret key is |φ0〉 = 1√n
∑n
k=1 a
†
k|vac〉 = 1√n
∑n
k=1 |Dk〉,
where a†k is the creation operator of the pulse in the k-th slot and |Dk〉 = a†k|vac〉. Then following the proposal of
DPS-QKD, Alice encodes an (n−1)-bit random secret key into this block. For an (n−1)-bit random but fixed integer
j, we express its (n − 1)-bit binary format as (j1j2 · · · jn−2jn−1)2. Then the encoded state of the block of a single
photon is, |φj〉 = 1√n
[
|D1〉+
∑n
k=2(−1)j
′
k−1 |Dk〉
]
, where j′k =
∑k
l=1 jl.
Given the above encoding scheme, we can construct the corresponding states in the entanglement-based protocol.
The equivalence between the entanglement-based and the prepare-and-measure protocols is obtained by following the
technique by Shor and Preskill[3]. For each encoding block Alice prepares additional (n− 1) qubits which are stored
without disturbances in her own quantum memory throughout the protocol. These qubits, labeled with A1, · · · , An−1,
are entangled with a single photon, labeled B in the corresponding block, which are described as
|φ〉 = 1√
2n−1
2n−1∑
j=0
[
(|j1〉A1 · · · |jn−1〉An−1)⊗ |φj〉B
]
. (1)
On Bob’s side, after he receives the single photons, he first applies quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement to
determine the number of incoming photons in a block and discard the blocks with multi photons or the vacuum. This
step is necessary because the following entanglement purification protocol requires a well-defined qubit on his side.
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FIG. 1: Schematics of the 1-bit delay M-Z interferometer
The QND measurement commutes with all other operations on Bob’s side. Therefore, in the prepare-and-measure
protocol, Bob can replace the QND measurement by the photon number resolving (PNR) detectors which are capable
of discriminating the vacuum, the single-photon state, and multi-photon states. Particularly, by using two PNR
detectors, Bob only accepts the instances when one detector obtains the single-photon state and the other one obtains
the vacuum state in one block.
Then, the single photon goes to a 1-bit delay M-Z interferometer, shown in Fig. 1. An incoming photon state in
|Dk〉, is split into four different photon states in the two output ports and two consecutive time slots. Particularly, we
obtain a†k ⇒ 12 (u†k + iv†k + u†k+1 − iv†k+1), where u†k and v†k are the creation operators of the pulses of the time slot k
in the two output ports. For convenience, Bob applies a π/2 phase rotation on each pulse in the bottom output port.
Given |Uk〉 = u†k|vac〉 and |Vk〉 = v†k|vac〉, the operation of the interferometer (MDPS) on each |Dk〉 can be written as
MDPS |Dk〉 = 1
2
(|Uk〉 − |Vk〉+ |Uk+1〉+ |Vk+1〉). (2)
Bob further applies a hypothetical filtering operation in order to project the single photon into a two-level state
required for the entanglement purification protocol. The filter operation is described by a set of Kraus operators
F = {F1, F2, · · · , Fn}, namely Fl = |Ul〉〈Ul|+ |Vl〉〈Vl|, for l = 2, · · · , n and F1 = I−
∑n
l=2 Fl in which I is the identity
matrix, namely, I =
∑n+1
l=1 (|Ul〉〈Ul| + |Vl〉〈Vl|). Note that the projection operators commute with each other and
represent monitoring the time slots of the detection events. Bob then publicly announces which time slot the photon
was projected to. Alice and Bob will discard the inconclusive blocks where Bob obtains F1. By its projection to a
certain time slot l, the photon is in a well-defined qubit state. Particularly, we can define the Z-basis of the photon as
4{|Ul〉, |Vl〉}, representing whether it travels along the top or bottom output port of the interferometer. Accordingly,
we define Bob’s Pauli operators as ZBl = |Ul〉〈Ul| − |Vl〉〈Vl| and XBl = |Ul〉〈Vl|+ |Vl〉〈Ul|.
Finally, Alice and Bob should tackle the eavesdropping and the channel errors. On the one hand, when the
channel is ideal and no eavesdropping exists, it is easy to show that Alice and Bob obtain a maximally entangled
pair from each projected qubit. Particularly, Alice discards all the qubits on her side with the label other than
l − 1, in which l is Bob’s projection outcome. Mathematically, it is equivalent to partially tracing these qubits in
the state of Eq. (1). Combining with Bob’s filter projection, Alice and Bob share the Bell state, namely, |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉Al−1 ⊗ |Ul〉B + |1〉Al−1 ⊗ |Vl〉B).
On the other hand, if the channel is noisy or there is an eavesdropper, Alice and Bob share a corrupted two-qubit
state. In this case, Alice and Bob employ an appropriate entanglement purification protocol based on Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) code[12], to distill the Bell state. If the entanglement purification protocol succeeds, the resulting
smaller set of states shared by Alice and Bob will have very high fidelity. Using the argument that high fidelity
implies low entropy[11] or composability argument[13], Alice and Bob can generate an unconditionally secure key by
measuring the distilled states in their own respective Z-basis. Therefore, the key to the unconditional security proof is
whether they can estimate the bit error rate and the phase error rate, which is necessary for choosing an appropriate
CSS code for the successful purification. As for the bit errors, Alice and Bob can estimate them by using test bits.
However, in the prepare-and-measure protocol, since they cannot directly measure the phase errors of the test bits,
they have to upper-bound them only from the observed quantities.
In what follows, we concentrate only on the untested bits, and for the estimation of the phase error rate, we appeal
to Azuma’s inequality[14, 15]. First, we define p
(k)
b,l as the probability of observing a bit error in the l-th time slot of
the k-th photon pair. We allow p
(k)
b,l to be dependent on the previous k − 1 events, in other words, this probability is
a conditional probability. Moreover, we define Neb,l as the number of the actual bit errors in the l-th time slot after
N-photon-pair emission. Similarly, we can define the sequence p
(k)
p,l and ep,l for the phase errors in the l-th time slot.
A consequence of Azuma’s inequality states that Pr
[∣∣∣∣eΛ,l −
P
N
k=1 p
(k)
Λ,l
N
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
]
≤ 2e−Nǫ2/2, for arbitrary positive number
ǫ, both Λ ∈ {b, p}, and all conclusive time slots l[15]. Therefore, if we can find the relation, ∑nl=2 p(k)p,l ≤∑nl=2 Clp(k)b,l
for certain C2, · · · , Cn, the total phase error rate ep =
∑n
l=2 ep,l can be bounded by the same relation, namely,
ep ≤
∑n
l=2 Cleb,l. On the other hand, the random sampling theory states that eb,l is close to the measured bit error
rate on the test bits with an exponentially small probability[11].
Eve’s most general attacks entangle the whole blocks with her ancila. Focusing on one certain block, e.g., the k-th
5block, the attacks can be reduced to a Kraus operator acting only on this block, by the following two steps: Firstly,
since Azuma’s inequality requires conditional probabilities, we suppose that Alice and Bob have performed fictitious
Bell measurements to test errors on the previous (k− 1) blocks. We project all the previous systems according to the
outcomes and trace out the (k − 1) blocks. Secondly, we trace out the (k + 1),-th · · · , n-th blocks and Eve’s ancila.
The resulting operator is Φk(ρk) =
∑
sE
(k)†
s ρkE
(k)
s , where ρk is the unperturbed state of the k-th block. Because the
actual measurement outcomes and Eve’s coherent attacks are unknown, the operator E
(k)
s is arbitrary and dependent
on arbitrary measurement outcomes of the previous (k − 1) blocks[15].
The linearity of the Kraus operator allow us to consider only one of its components, E
(k)
s = (aij), an arbitrary
(n× n)-dimension matrix acting on the single-photon state. The corrupted state of the k-th block becomes E(k)s |φ〉.
The final state after Bob’s interferometer and the filter operation is |φ(k)l 〉 = FlMDPSE(k)s |φ〉. Therefore, for this
time slot, we can obtain the possibilities p
(k)
b,l = 〈φ(k)l |
−ZAl−1ZBl
2 |φ
(k)
l 〉 and p(k)p,l = 〈φ(k)l |
−XAl−1XBl
2 |φ
(k)
l 〉, which are
conditioned on arbitrary previous events. The calculations show that
p
(k)
b,l =
1
4n [ |al−1,l−1 − al,l|2 + |al−1,l − al,l−1|2 + (|al−1,1|2 + · · ·+ |al−1,l−2|2 + |al−1,l+1|2 + · · ·+ |al−1,n|2) +
(|al,1|2 + · · ·+ |al,l−2|2 + |al,l+1|2 + · · ·+ |al,n|2)], (3)
p
(k)
p,l =
1
2n [ |al,1|2 + · · ·+ |al,l−1|2 + |al−1,l|2 + · · ·+ |al−1,n|2]. (4)
By observing that for any two complex numbers a and b, |a|2 + |b|2 ≤ 3+
√
5
2 (|a − b|2 + |a|2), we derive that
2n
∑n
l=2 p
(k)
p,l −4n
∑N
l=2 p
(k)
p,l ≤ [(|a1,2|2+|a2,1|2)−(|a1,2−a2,1|2+|a2,1|2)]+[(|an−1,n|2+|an,n−1|2)−(|an−1,n−an,n−1|2+
|an−1,n|2] ≤ (1 +
√
5)/2[(|a1,2 − a2,1|2 + |a2,1|2) + (|an−1,n − an,n−1|2 + |an−1,n|2)] ≤ (1 +
√
5)/2 × 4n∑Nl=2 p(k)b,l , or
equivalently
∑n
l=2 p
(k)
p,l ≤ (3 +
√
5)
∑n
l=2 p
(k)
b,l . It should be emphasized that the relations are general for arbitrary
matrix component and arbitrary previous measurement outcomes. Using Azuma’s inequality, we therefore obtain
ep ≤ (3 +
√
5)
n∑
l=2
eb,l = (3 +
√
5)eb, (5)
where eb =
∑n
l=2 eb,l is the total bit error rate over all conclusive time slots. The derivation clearly demonstrates the
essence of DPS-QKD in which the upper bound of the phase error rate in certain time slot can only be estimated by
combining the bit error rates in the same and adjacent time slots. Note that this upper bound does not apply to the
n = 2 case in which the phase error rate can be as high as 50% and we have no chance to generate the secret key.
This is the case where Alice uses two orthogonal states and Eve has free access to the information. The upper bound
6is valid for n ≥ 3 in which the states are mutually non-orthogonal and no unambiguous state discrimination exists.
This results share some similarity in the security proof of the Bennet 1992 protocol[16].
Combining the above three arguments, we can derive the unconditionally secure key rate of the entanglement-based
DPS-QKD and the single-photon DPS-QKD, namely,
RDPS ≥ pDPS
[
1−H(eb)−H((3 +
√
5)eb)
]
, (6)
where H(x) is the binary Shannon entropy, namely, H(x) = −x log2(x)−(1−x) log2(1−x), and pDPS is the conclusive
detector click rate per pulse in DPS-QKD.
Finally, we compare the key rates of the unconditionally secure BB84 protocol (RBB84)[3], DPS-QKD against
general attack for individual photons (RIND)[9], and unconditionally secure DPS-QKD (RDPS). We assume single-
photon sources in all three protocols. In the presence of channel losses, we express that RBB84 = pBB84 [1− 2H(eb)],
and RIND = pIND
{
− log2
[
1− e2b − (1−6eb)
2
2
]
−H(eb)
}
, where pBB84 and pIND are the conclusive detector click
rates per pulse in the corresponding protocols. Here we adopt the result of DPS-QKD against general attack for
individual photons[9] to the case with a single-photon source. We assume that the coding efficiency for the bit error
correction approaches to Shannon limit in all three cases. When RBB84, RIND and RDPS hit zero, the upper bound
of the tolerable bit error rates for three protocols are found to be 11%, 6.09%, and 4.12% respectively. Note that in
DPS-QKD the phase error rate is indirectly estimated by MDPS and the filter while it is directly estimated in the
BB84 protocol. This is an essential insight we obtained in this Letter, and this poor estimation results in lower error
rate threshold of DPS-QKD compared to the one of the BB84 protocol.
To simulate the resulting key rates, we take the parameters from Ref. [7], where the dark count rate, the time
window and the baseline error rate are 50 Hz, 50 ps and 2.3 % respectively. Therefore, the dark count rate per detector
per time slot is d = 2.5 × 10−9. We assume that all protocols use two detectors. So pBB84 = (η + 2d)/2, where η is
the total efficiency including the channel, the detectors and all other devices. In DPS-QKD, we further assume that
the loss event happens equally on every pulse in the transmission, so that the probability of getting a conclusive event
is (n − 1)/n. On the other hand, a dark count can occur in every time slot with equal probability. Therefore, by
noting that Bob obtains at most 1 photon out of a block with n pulses, pIND = pDPS = η(n− 1)/n2 + 2d(n− 1)/n.
Moreover, the bit error rates can be modeled as eb = (eη+d)/(η+2d) for the BB84 protocol and eb = [eη(n−1)/n2+
d(n− 1)/n]/[η(n− 1)/n2 + 2d(n− 1)/n] for DPS-QKD, where e is the baseline error rate given above.
Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the secure key rates per pulse and the energy efficiencies, namely, the secure key rates
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FIG. 2: Secure key rates per pulse (a) and per emitting photon (b) as a function of the total loss. Red solid line: RBB84 ; blue
dashed line and green dash-dot line: RDPS with n = 3, 10 respectively; black dash-dot line and light blue dashed line: RIND
with n = 3, 10 respectively.
per emitting photon. As expected, the unconditionally secure key rate and the upper bound of the tolerable bit
error rate of DPS-QKD are lower than those of DPS-QKD against general attack for individual photons. From Fig.
2(b), larger n has higher energy efficiency because every photon received by Bob has lower chance to be discarded.
However, larger n will decrease the probability of getting a signal from a pulse and increase the dark count rate per
block, and thus lead to lower secure key rate per pulse and lower achievable distance as shown in Fig. 2(a). Based
on these observations, we find that n = 3 yields the optimal secure key rate per pulse and the maximum achievable
distance.
In conclusion, we have proven the unconditional security of DPS-QKD with a single-photon source and evaluated
its secure key rate. The security is based on the non-orthogonality of the encoding states for n ≥ 3 and Bob’s 1-bit
delay operation. We hope that our unconditional security proof is a first step toward the security proof of coherent
state DPS-QKD.
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